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MANAGERlAL PERCEPTIONS OF PORTER’S GENERIC 
STRATEGIES 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper begins with an appraisal of Porter’s Generic Strategy 
(1980,1985) concepts. This appraisal includes a review of the 
attempts to test out these concepts empirically. This opening 
section concludes with a summary of the main issues raised by 
the discussion. 
Then the results of a questionnaire survey into managers’ 
perceptions of the compettitive strategy of their firm are 
presented and analysed. The results of this analysis suggest that 
managers do not perceive of their firm’s strategy in terms of 
Porter’s Generic Strategies. 
The final part of the paper outlines a “managerial” theory of 
competitive strategy derived from the analysis of the managers’ 
responses. 
2 ASSESSING THE GENERIC STRATEGY CONCEPTS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE LITERATURE 
Porter (1980;1985) suggests that there are three “Generic 
Strategies”: Cost Leadership, Differentiation and Focus. The 
Focus strategy requires the firm to apply one or other (or both) 
of the other strategies to a narrow segment of the market, to 
gain advantage. Firms that do not pursue these strategies, or who 
flip unsuccessfully between them, run the risk of being “stuck- 
in-the-middle” and performing at or below the industry average. 
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Taken together empirical investigations into the generic 
strategies have been inconclusive (Dess and Davis 1982,1984; 
Hambrick 1983a, 1983b; Miller and Friesen 1986a, 1986b; 
Phillips, Chang and Buzzell 1983; White 1986). But some of the 
problems in researching these concepts result from the 
inconsistent way in which the strategies are interpreted. 
2.1. COST LEADERSHIP 
With respect to Porter’s Cost Leadership strategy, it is evident 
from the literature that there are very important differences in 
the way in which researchers have interpreted this competitive 
strategy. 
Porter argues that, for cost leadership to yield superior profits, 
the firm must combine lowest costs with average prices. 
However, successful cost leaders that he chooses to exemplify 
his theory could be regarded as competing on price (eg Hyundai: 
European Management Journal 1987; La Quinta: Harvard 1988; and 
Harnischfeger: Porter 1980:37). Or, by coincidence, the examples 
could merely be selected from price sensitive segments. 
If this was the case, then Hyundai would be charging average 
prices for this particular segment (which might include Proton 
and Lada as direct competitors). The question wouid then be: are 
Hyundai the lowest cost of the car producers serving this 
segment? It is not clear from Porter’s use of this example that 
this is the inference he is making. In the context of his 
exposition, he is arguing that Hyundai is a low price car 
producer, who is targeting a price sensitive segment of the 
market. 
The means to achieving the lowest cost position (eg a 
“conveyorized assembly line”, Porter 1980:37) often require a 
high degree of stability, and standardization in the product or 
service being offered. Again, these may well be requirements of 
particular segments who find a “standard, no frills product” 
acceptable (Porter 1985:13). Skivington and Daft (1991) suggest 
-3- 
that: 
“Low cost strategic decisions are often found in markets 
where commodity-like products and price sensitive buyers 
collectively pressure firms to engage in price competition” 
(Skivington and Daft 199150) 
And Miller (‘1988) makes a strong connection between the cost 
leadership strategy and low prices to satisfy price sensitive 
customers: 
“User’s of the [cost leadership] strategy are likely to confront 
the least environmental unpredictability and change. They seek 
out customers who care more about price than about image or 
novelty..” (Miller 1988:284-5) 
If the low cost position is translated into, say, lower prices, 
then the firm should increase its market share, but it may well 
not improve the firm’s relative profitability. For now, the cost 
leader is no longer charging average prices, and, therefore there 
is no guarantee that its low cost position would lead to above 
average profits. 
The connection between cost leadership, serving price sensitive 
customers and competing on price is made in a number of studies 
into the generic strategy concepts. In Dess and Davis’ (1984) 
study statements associated with the three generic strategies 
(cost leadership, differentiation and focus) were tested with 
two different groups: managers and “experts” in strategic 
management. The experts were required to read Porter (1980: 
Chapter 2) and then to rate a list of 21 statements of 
“competitive methods” according to its importance for each 
generic strategy. The experts rated “Competitive Pricing” as 
being strongly associated with cost leadership (a mean rating of 
4.86, with 5 as the maximum). 
McNamee and McHugh’s (1989) attempt to test out Porter’s 
concepts in the clothing industry refers to “low price” strategies 
rather than cost leadership. Karnani (1984) infers that, for cost 
leadership to be attained the firm must compete on price. And 
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Govindarajan (1986), citing Porter (1985), maintains that: 
“a strategy of low cost signifies an attempt to sell an 
essentially. undifferentiated product at lower-than-average 
market price.” (Govindarajan 1986:848) 
Throughout Govindarajan’s article he refers to Porter’s “low 
cost” strategy. This illustrates a lack of precision in the 
interpretation of Porter that contributes to the confusion 
surrounding the generic strategy concepts. 
In Miller and Friesen’s empirical investigation of the generic 
strategies (1986a; 1986b) they refer to cost leaders offering 
lower prices, and pricing “aggressively” to build market share. 
This study also illustrates some other difficulties of definition 
encountered in researching the generic strategies. They list a 
number of “strategic choice variables” extracted from the PIMS 
database, that they believe are associated with the generic 
strategies. For cost leadership these variables are as follows: 
l Price Difference 
l Vertical integration 
l Newness of plant and equipment 
l Capacity utilization 
l Relative direct costs 
l Process R&D/Value added 
None of these variables, taken singly or in combination would 
necessarily lead to an SBU becoming a “cost leader” in its 
industry. Nevertheless, this does not prevent Miller and Friesen 
(1986a) from drawing conclusions about “cost leadership” SBUs, 
or indeed identifying “Differentiators” that are also “cost 
leaders”(Miller and Friesen 1986a:49). These interpretations are 
all the more surprising given that their study found a number of 
“cost leaders” within the same industry (consumer durables). In a 
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similar vein, Dess and Davis (1984) are prepared to conclude that 
a cluster of four firms in the same industry are “cost leaders”. 
These are not trivial points. They illustrate a lack of rigour that 
seems to be endemic to empirical studies of the generic 
strategies. It would be more appropriate if Miller and Friesen 
referred to SBUs that score highly on these variables as “cost 
control” SBUs, as there is no evidence that they have achieved 
THE lowest cost position in their industries, or that they were 
striving to achieve this position. 
To conclude, there appears to be some confusion surrounding the 
strategy of cost leadership. It is not clear whether cost 
leadership is necessarily associated with competing on price, 
and there is evidence that some investigators are using the term 
loosely to imply a “cost control” orientation. Finally, a strong 
connection is made in the literature (by Porter and others) 
between cost leadership and serving price sensitive, commodity- 
like market segments. Thus the choice of generic competitive 
strategy is being confused with the selection of a target market 
segment. 
2.2 DIFFERENTIATION 
Similarly to cost leadership, Differentiation has been variously 
interpreted. Porter argues that differentiators achieve superior 
profits through their ability to premium price (Porter 1980:38). 
He states that: 
“The ultimate test of differentiation is: do you command a 
premium price?” (European Management Journal 1987:6) 
However, Hill (1988) suggests that an aim of differentiation is 
“to capture more of the market at the same price”; Hill does not, 
then, automatically associate differentiation with premium 
pricing. 
Porter himself relaxes the connection between a differentiation 
strategy and premium pricing in his video case’ examples 
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(Harvard 1988). Citing American Airlines as his example of a 
broad scope differentiator, he suggests that their superior 
performance results not from the ability to premium price, but 
from their -ability to increase market share. 
Hill (1988) considers the connections between differentiation 
and demand: 
“Investment expenditure aimed at differentiating a product 
has two effects upon demand. The first is to create brand 
loyalty, decreasing the price elasticity of demand for the firm’s 
product. The second is to broaden the appeal of a product, 
enabling the firm to capture more of the market at a given price 
and to increase the volume sold.... The immediate effect of 
differentiation will be to increase unit costs. However, if costs 
fall with increasing volume, the long-run effect may be to 
reduce unit costs. Three sources of declining costs can be 
identified: learning effects, economies of scale, and economies 
of scope....Whether differentiation is consistent with 
establishing an overall low-cost position depends on the extent 
to which costs decline with increasing volume.” (Hill 
1988:402/3) 
Thus, for Hill differentiation need not necessarily be associated 
with premium pricing (see also Bamberger 1989:80), nor does he 
perceive particular problems in pursuing both differentiation and 
cost leadership simultaneously. 
He goes on to argue that “.. efficiency is not so much a strategy as 
a function of the skill with which a firm manages the process of 
converting inputs into outputs.” (Hill 1988:410). This leads us 
into the next contentious area: whether firms that try to achieve 
both sources of advantage run the risk of being “stuck-in-the- 
middle”. 
2.3 “STUCK-IN-THE-MIDDLE” 
Porter maintains that: 
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“a firm that engages in each generic strategy but fails to 
achieve any of them is “stuck in the middle”. It possesses no 
competitive advantage . . . ..Becoming stuck in the middle is often a 
manifestation of a firm’s unwillingness to make choices about 
how to compete. It tries for competitive advantage through every 
means and achieves none, because achieving different types of 
competitive advantage usually requires inconsistent actions” 
(Porter 1985:16-l 7) 
In addressing the issue of achieving both sources of advantage 
Murray (1988) argues that: 
“...the exogenous preconditions for a viable cost leadership 
strategy stem principaliy from the industry’s structural 
characteristics [vertical integration confers benefits, process 
innovations can still be realised, learning effects can still be 
realised, optimai scale exceeds 50% of market]. The 
preconditions for product differentiation stem primarily from 
customer tastes. Because these two sets of exogenous factors 
are independent, the possibility of a firm pursuing cost 
leadership and product differentiation simultaneously is not 
precluded.” (Murray 1988:395) 
Karnani (1984) argues that “a firm cannot afford to emphasise 
one dimension at the cost of neglecting the other. Moreover, the 
relative contribution to successful performance of the two ways 
of gaining competitive advantage depends on certain 
characteristics of the specific industry one is considering” 
(1984:379) 
Cronshaw, Davis and Kay (1990) point out some of the differing 
interpretations of the “stuck-in-the-middle” concept. It has been 
used, as in the discussion above, to refer to not making a choice 
between the two generic strategies. It has, however, also been 
used (by Porter and others) to refer to market positioning (opting 
for a “middle market” position), and to a general lack of clarity 
in strategy. 
The link between industry, or segment situation and the choice 
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of generic strategy explored by Murray (1988) is shared by 
Hambrick (1983a): 
“It is simply not accurate to say that all generic strategies 
are equally viable within an industry....any broadly ‘generic’ 
strategy is really a composite of numerous variations, not all of 
which are equally suited to a given situation.” (Hambrick 
1983a:702) 
Porter’s (1985) concepts of “parity” and “proximity” are relevant 
to this discussion: 
“a cost leader must achieve parity or proximity in the bases 
of differentiation relative to its competitors to be an above 
average performer..” (Porter 1985:13), and “a differentiator 
. . ..aims at cost parity or proximity relative to its competitors...” 
(Porter 1985:14) 
Murray (1988) concludes from this that: 
“This implies that a cost leader that competes against a 
product differentiator must also be a product differentiator, and 
vice versa.” (Murray 1988:396) 
3 ACHIEVING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Perhaps the most important question that must be asked of the 
generic strategies is “do they lead to competitive advantage?” 
Related to this basic question is the (usually implied) 
assumption that competitive advantage leads through to superior 
profitability. We shall now explore these two issues. 
In Porter’s “Competitive Advantage” (1985) the axes of his Three 
Generic Strategies diagram are labelled “Competitive Advantage” 
and “Competitive Scope” (see Figure 1). It is reasonable, then, to 
ask whether these generic strategies do in fact lead to 
competitive advantage. 
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FIGURE 1 PORTER’S THREE GENERIC STRATEGIES (198512) 
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Mathur (1988) suggests that “competitive strategy is primarily 
concerned with the positioning of the firm’s outputs (or 
offerings),. not of inputs” (Mathur 1988:30). As far as the 
customer is concerned the cost leadership strategy is invisible; 
the cost leader may offer average quality products at average 
prices, there is no discernible advantage accruing to the 
customer from purchasing from the cost leader. In this sense, 
then, it is difficult to see how cost leadership, by itself, can 
convey any competitive advantage. 
However, the consequences of being the lowest cost producer 
could enable the firm to pursue competitive advantages: 
l Low cost enables the firm to compete with lower prices 
l Low cost enables the firm to offer superior quality for the 
same (industry average) price 
But, cost leadership per se does not confer a competitive 
advantage. 
Does differentiation confer competitive advantage? Central to 
Porter’s theoretical schema is the concept of the “industry”. 
Indeed, the generic strategies are derived, and their advantages 
are explained in the context of a discernible industry structure 
(Porter 1980). However, there are problems in defining the 
boundaries of an industry. 
For instance, Murray (1988) cites Southlands 7-l 1 stores as 
exemplifying product differentiation based on convenience, 
“but this is only when they are compared with food retailers 
targeting other market segments (eg supermarkets). When they 
are compared with other firms competing in their own niche (ie 
other convenience stores), it becomes clear that 7-l 1 stores 
strive for cost leadership.” (Murray 1988: 391). 
So, as more than one firm in an industry can pursue 
differentiation, we may see several firms, all serving similar 
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customers, all “premium pricing”. But how does a firm achieve 
superior performance if all its rivals are “premium pricing” to 
the same extent? Indeed, over whom are these firms charging 
premium prices? 
Problems of industry definition and segmentation occur 
frequently in discussions of the generic strategy concepts. The 
definition of the industry (ie who are the firm’s competitors) is 
clearly a key issue. 
Day and Wensley (1988) distinguish between customer-focussed 
and competitor-centred approaches to competitive position. They 
conclude that: 
“The appropriate unit of analysis to reveal [competitive] 
advantage is a market segment characterized by a distinct 
profile of benefits” (Day and Wensley 1988:16). 
Dickson and Ginter (1987) define market segmentation as a 
“state of demand heterogeneity such that the total market 
demand can be disaggregated into segments with distinct demand 
functions” (Dickson and Ginter 1987:5). 
This problem has been acknowledged by Porter and others with 
the development of the the Strategic Groups concept (Porter 
1985; McGee and Thomas 1986; Mascarenhas and Aaker 1989). 
Although, developing Day and Wensley’s (1988) point, arranging 
firms into “strategic groups” may be neither a customer- 
focussed, nor a competitor-centred approach; the grouping could 
be imposed on an industry by an interested academic. 
In an article based on a transcript of a TV programme (European 
Management Journal 1987) Porter explains the generic strategies 
with reference to the “auto” industry. He uses examples from the 
industry to illustrate each of the four cells of the generic 
strategy diagram (Figure 1). For the broad target cost leader he 
cites Toyota; for the broad target differentiator he suggests 
General Motors in the US; his narrow target cost focusser is 
Hyundai; Mercedes and BMW represent Differentiation focussers. 
-12- 
(Interestingly in “Competitive Strategy” (Porter 1980:43) he 
cites General Motors as an example of a cost leader). 
Clearly, Porter is using a broad definition of the auto industry to 
make his points, but this example illustrates very well the 
problems with the generic strategy concept. Over whom have 
Mercedes (the successful focusssed differentiatorsj gained a 
competitive advantage ? It obviously is not, say Hyundai, or even 
Toyota, as it would be difficult to argue that these firms were 
targetting the same customers as Mercedes. In this sense, it is 
not particularly useful to regard Mercedes and Hyundai as being 
in the same “industry”, if an industry is defined as firms in 
competition with each other; they would clearly not belong to 
the same “strategic group”. 
To see whether Mercedes have gained a competitive advantage 
we would need to take the consumer’s perspective, and compare 
the consumer’s perceptions of the alternatives that are 
available. It is very likely that the consumer would be comparing 
Mercedes with similarly priced cars, with similar specifications 
(eg Jaguar, BMW). To judge Mercedes competitive position we 
would need to know whether an increasing, or decreasing number 
of consumers in this target segment were buying Mercedes cars. 
So Porter’s test of the successful differentiation strategy 
(whether the firm can command a premium price: European 
Management Journal 1987) may not apply when the “industry” is 
defined from the customer’s perspective, rather than from the 
firm’s. 
To take this argument further, if we take the view that the 
customer is interested not in the product or service per se, but 
the extent to which the product can satisfy his or her needs, then 
quite different industry definitions emerge. Take, for example, 
the Isle of Wight Zoo. A product/service based industry 
definition would pitch the zoo against all other zoos in the UK. A 
customer needs-based definition would have to start from an 
understanding of the needs of the existing and potential 
customers of the zoo. 
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For some segments the zoo would indeed be perceived to be in 
competition with other mainland zoos (the keen student of 
animal behaviour); but for most customers the competing 
suppliers of their needs would include theme parks, a waxwork 
museum, a craft centre. Here the needs of the customers are to 
pleasantly pass an afternoon when it is too cold to go to the 
beach. Taking these customer based definitions of the industry 
can result in radically different perceptions of the competition, 
and they also require a rethinking of the “Substitute” threat in 
Porter’s Structural Analysis of Industries (Porter 1980). 
To conclude this section, the confusion between competitive 
strategy and the targetting of different market segments is well 
exemplified in a discussion between Porter and David Sainsbury 
(European Management Journal 1987). It is worth examining in 
detail the exchanges between Porter and Sainsbury as they 
illustrate some of the difficulties with the generic strategy 
concepts. 
Sainsbury: “The.. bit I don’t agree with is the idea that if you 
are stuck in the middle, that’s some great disadvantage, because 
it seems to me that you do have customers who are only 
interested in price. At the other end, you’ve got some people who 
are interested only in quality and will pay anything to get it. But 
the great majority of people are interested in both quality and 
price, which is summed up in the phrase “value for money”. I 
think you can have a strategy which is focused, as we are, 
absolutely on that midd!e range.” 
Porter: “David said we’re not interested in the part of the 
market that’s only price sensitive. That part of the market is the 
province of cost. This would be typified by a company that was 
adopting a very stripped-down, warehouse operation, orienting 
on prices and sales. That’s a focus strategy. David also said he 
was not interested in the sort of premium which I might pay if 
anything was the most exotic, individual, stylish, etc. 
Sainsbury: “We’re not a delicatessen.” 
Porter: “You’re not a delicatessen. But what about the 
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differentiation approach that would go after that completely 
price insensitive customer, giving him all kinds of service and 
handholding?” 
Here Porter is arguing that serving the very price sensitive 
segment is the province of a cost focusser, and serving the price 
insensitive consumer is the province of the differentiator. But it 
is not at all clear that the selection of either segment to target 
necessarily confers any competitive advantage. It would be 
entirely consistent with Porter’s theory (Porter 1980) for a firm 
to pursue a cost leadership strategy in either of these segments. 
With respect to the price-insensitive segment, this would 
involve selling at average prices for firms serving that segment, 
but having the lowest costs (of firms serving that segment). 
Similarly, it is conceivable that a firm could target the price 
sensitive segment and pursue a differentiation strategy: here the 
firm would be able to price marginally above the average prices 
of firms serving this segment. 
But to be a “true” focussed cost leader serving the price 
sensitive segment would require the firm to charge average 
prices and achieve the lowest cost position of the firms serving 
this segment. And, again, to be a “true” focussed differentiator 
serving the delicatessen segment, the firm would have to 
premium price above other delicatessens. Figure 2 summarises 
this argument, using two segments of a market. In each case, the 
above average player in the segment outperforms its rivals 
serving this segment (the “average” players). 
Thus comparing firms within a broad definition of the “grocery” 
industry, as Porter does in his discussion with Sainsbury, 
involves comparing firms who are not perceived, from the 
vantage point of an individual consumer, to be in competition 
with each other (whether the consumer is in the price sensitive 
segment, the price insensitive segment, or middle ground). 
To summarise this review of the literature, a number of issues 
concerning the generic strategies have emerged: 
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FIGURE 2 Segments and Superior Performance 
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* Is cost leadership associated with competing on price? If 
it is, then it is not clear that the combination of a low price/low 
cost strategy will lead to superior profit performance. 
+ Do differentiators premium price? Or can they achieve 
superior performance by increasing market share? 
l How is competition to be defined? Over whom do the firm 
premium price, or achieve lowest costs? Indeed, is the selection 
of one of Porter’s generic strategies more a decision about 
where to compete than about how to compete? 
l Can firms pursue cost leadership and differentiation 
simultaneously? 
l Do either of the generic strategies lead to competitive 
advantage defined in “output” terms (ie. increasing market 
share)? 
To conclude this discussion it is useful to trace the origins of 
Porter’s approach. The Generic Strategy concepts were derived 
from an economics perspective. Fundamental to Porter’s theory 
is the concept of the industry (Porter 1980:1), and its 
“underlying economic structure” (Porter 1980:3). The industry is 
conceived of in “product” terms, and competition is defined by 
firms that offer products that are “close substitutes for each 
other” (Porter 1980:5). The generic strategies are presented as 
ways of “coping with the five competitive forces” (Porter 
1980:35), and they are essentially tautologies (the lowest cost 
producer that charges average prices must, by definition, have 
above average profits; similarly, the differentiator that 
combines premium prices with average costs, must have above 
average profits). Porter supports his theory with numerous 
anecdotal examples of firms supposedly pursuing one or other of 
the generic strategies. 
In order to answer some of the questions listed above, therefore, 
it may be appropriate to adopt a non-economics based 
perspective. The intention is to draw on the perceptions of 
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practising managers to inform our understanding of competitive 
strategy (previous studies adopting this approach include Dess 
and Davis (1984) and Aaker (1989)). In this way a “managerial 
theory” of. competitive strategy can be constructed which 
addresses the ambiguities and inconsistencies in Porter’s 
concepts. 
4 MANAGERIAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE GENERIC 
STRATEGIES 
To explore managerial perceptions of Porter’s Generic Strategies 
a questionnaire was constructed using statements that pertain 
to either Cost Leadership or Differentiation. These statements 
were derived from Porter (1980, 1985), standard policy 
textbooks (Thompson and Strickland, Johnson and Scholes) and 
from research into the generic strategy concepts (Dess and 
Davis; Miller; Hill; Murray). 
An original list of 40 statements was tested with a panel of 
experts in strategic management. They were asked to classify 
each statement as pertaining to either cost leadership, 
differentiation, both strategies, or neither strategy. From this 
evaluation the statements were reduced to 25 that were 
unanimously classified as relating to either cost leadership or 
differentiation. 
The questionnaire was then extensively tested with practicing 
managers. (This is described at length in Bowman 1991). The 
result of the pilot testing and development was a 21 statement 
questionnaire (which includes some statements about 
organizational change). The questionnaire can be found in the 
appendix to this paper. 
The questionnaire was then administered to 1100 managers from 
over 150 different Strategic Business Units (SBUs). The 
managers were largely from the top management teams of their 
SBU, or were from functions reporting directly to the top team. 
The managers’ SBUs cover a very wide spectrum of business 
activity, including manufacturing and services, and with size 
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ranging from small partnerships to mulitnational enterprises. 
As the statements were derived from Porter’s Generic Strategies 
we would .expect that, if managers conceive of the strategy of 
their SBU in line with Porter’s concepts, there responses to the 
questionnaire would reflect this. Thus they would rate 
statements about cost leadership consistently high (or low) 
according to whether or not they saw their SBU pursuing this 
strategy. Similarly, the managers would rate the Differentiation 
statements consistently high or low. 
To test this, the data was factor analysed. Factor analysis 
groups statements that correlate with each other. So, if 
manageis perceive the strategy of their SBU in line with Porter’s 
generic strategies, we would expect two Factors to emerge, 
which correspond to the generic strategies (because the 
questionnaire also includes statements about organizational 
change, we would expect a third factor, “Change” to emerge from 
the analysis) 
If managers perceived the strategies of their SBUs in line with 
Porter, we would expect three factors to have Eigenvalues > 1 
(corresponding to cost leadership, differentiation and change). 
This would indicate that each of the factors explains more of the 
variance in the data than an individual variable. This rule of 
thumb is frequently used when interpreting the underlying 
structure of a set of data (Dess and Davis:1 984). 
However, the factor analysis reveals that five factors have 
eigenvalues > 1 .O . This suggests that five factors reflect the 
structure of the data, rather than three (see Table 1). 
The five factors have the following variables (statements) 
loading on them (loadings > 0.5): 
Factor 1 : VI, ~13, v5, v8, ~6: 
Factor 2 : ~14, v2, VI 6, (~20) (~4): 
Factor 3: v7, (vl2), VIO, v9 : 
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Table 1 Five Factor Solution: Rotated Loadings 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
V( 1) Operating Costs 0.818 0.060 -0.012 0.097 0.002 
V(13) Monitor Costs 0.797 0.083 -0.017 0.085 0.020 
V(5) Cut Overheads 0.681 0.054 0.008 0.131 -0.146 
V(8) Capacity Utilization 0.558 0.004 0.020 0.118 0.193 
V(6) Low Cost Supply 0.538 -0.029 0.055 0.336 0.020 
V( 14) Different Operations 0.005 0.801 0.074 0.120 0.028 
V(2) Changed Strategy 
V(16) Changed Structure 
V(20) Same Operations 
V(4) Little Org. Change 
V(7) Regular NPD 
V/(12) No Product Change 
V(10) NPD Priority 
V(9) Unique Products 
V(21) Competitive Prices 
V( 11) Emphasize Prices 
V(l9j Lowest Cost 
V(15) Price Sensitive 
V( 18) Superior Products 
V( 17) Sales Information 
V(3) Distinctive Products 
0.009 
0.013 
-0.018 
-0.175 
-0.010 
0.017 
0.041 
0.046 
0.142 
0.101 
0.234 
0.426 
0.146 
-0.261 
0.147 
0.744 
0.731 
-0.705 
-0.606 
0.097 
-0.234 
0.110 
-0.025 
0.084 
-0.037 
0.063 
0.157 
0.137 
0.017 
0.027 
-0.022 
0.109 
-0.180 
-0.062 
0.753 
-0.706 
0.675 
0.508 
-0.151 
0.120 
0.079 
0.073 
0.185 
-0.206 
0.288 
0.074 
0.136 
0.026 
0.122 
0.144 
0.156 
0.199 
-0.188 
0.778 
0.753 
0.616 
0.538 
0.153 
0.080 
0.044 
-0.003 
0.048 
0.024 
-0.135 
0.217 
0.170 
0.249 
0.542 
0.095 
0.104 
-0.084 
0.165 
0.660 
0.652 
0.626 
Percentage of Total Variance 
Explained 13.25 13.05 9.73 10.51 8.67 
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Factor 4: v21, VII, v19, VI5 : 
Factor .5: VI 8, ~17, v3, v9 : 
(Variables in brackets indicate negative loadings) 
4.1 DESCRIBING THE FIVE FACTOR SOLUTION 
Factor 1: Cost Control 
This factor is easily interpretable as “cost control”. The 
statements that load on it are about monitoring and controlling 
operating costs (VI, v13), cutting overheads (v5), maintaining 
capacity utilization (v8), securing low cost supply (~6). 
Interestingly, VI9 (“We aim to be the lowest cost producer in our 
industry”) does not load strongly on this factor (a loading of only 
0.234). 
Factor 2: Change 
This is the “Change” factor. Statements about changing 
operations (~14, v20), changing strategic direction (~2) and 
changing organizational structures and processes (~16) all load 
onto this factor. However, the statements about product change, 
and new product development do not load on this factor (~7, ~12, 
~10). This suggests that managers do not perceive organizational 
change and product change as necessarily related. 
Factor 3: New Product Development 
The product change statements load on this factor (~7, VI 2, ~10). 
But, in addition v9 (“We try to offer unique products/services 
enabling us to charge premium prices”) also has a loading greater 
than 0.5 (0.508). This would suggest that new product 
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development is linked to the achievement of uniqueness, and to 
premium pricing. 
Factor 4: Compete on Price 
This factor embraces the statements to do with competing on 
price (VI I), offering similar products/services to the 
competition (~21) and having price sensitive customers (~15). 
Statement 19 (“We aim to be the lowest cost producer in our 
industry”) also loads on this factor (0.616). This would support 
the suggestion that some managers have interpreted this 
statement as aiming to be the lowest PRICED producer. However, 
we cannot exclude the explanation that other managers perceive 
that, to compete on price, an SBU needs to be very low cost. 
Factor 5: Superior Products 
This factor has statements about offering superior, and unique 
products (~18, v9), emphasizing distinctive products in 
marketing communications (~3). Sales performance information 
is considered to be more important than cost control information 
(~17). Factor 5, then is about offering superior 
products/services, and being sales, not cost orientated. 
The four strategy-orientated factors (Fl, F3, F4, F5) can be 
summarised as follows: 
Fl Cost control 
F3 New product development 
F4 Compete on price 
F5 Superior products 
4.2 INTERPRETING FACTOR 1: “COST CONTROL” 
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The cost control factor (Factor 1) is focussed exclusively 
internally on priorities associated with cost reduction and 
efficiency. 
Factor 1 (cost control) pursued alone by an SBU would not confer 
competitive advantage. Cost control per se is invisible to 
consumers. Cost advantages can be translated into either lower 
prices, or higher perceived value (by adding product features 
whilst not raising the price) which would confer competitive 
advantage. Cost control activities that were not converted into 
either of these forms of competitive advantage would lead to 
superior profits if the firm was able to achieve a lower than 
average cost level as a result. However, the risk of pursuing just 
cost control are that the firm may be out manoeuvered by a 
competitor. The profit advantages may prove to be short term if 
competitors move to cut price, and/or add perceived value. 
4.3 INTERPRETING FACTOR 4: COMPETE ON PRICE 
Factor 4 (Compete on price) includes the need to be the lowest 
cost producer. Firms may proactively opt for this strategy (to 
squeeze out competitors, for example), or firms may find 
themselves left with this as the only option. Miller and Friesen’s 
(1986a) Cluster 3 and 4 SBUs could be regarded as pursuing a 
proactive price competitive strategy. These SBUs support their 
competitive prices with efforts to reduce costs. 
However, if there has been little effort put into improving the 
perceived value of the products, a firm may find itself falling 
behind its competitors. Faced with falling market share the 
management may cut prices. However, unless the firm has a very 
low (relative) cost base the squeeze on margins that may result 
from price cutting could be crippling. 
Unfortunately, if the firm has fallen behind the competition with 
respect to perceived value, it may well be lacking in a positive 
drive to control costs. In short, the firm may generally lack 
strategic direction. The absence of strategic purpose that led to 
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the the problem with relative perceived value may not be 
compensated by a strong sustained drive to cut costs. So we may 
find a poorly managed firm being forced to compete on price, 
recognising that they have to be lowest cost, but without the 
emphasis on cost control that would be required to achieve the 
lowest cost position (ie Factor 3 not combined with a strong 
Factor 1 thrust). 
Miller and Friesen’s empirical study (1986a;1986b) revealed four 
“failure” clusters of SBUs. In explaining some of these clusters 
they surmise a vicious circle of failure: “...poor product quality 
can erode market share, requiring a subsequent reduction in 
prices.” (Miller and Friesen 1986b:258). 
Thus we would expect that a strong cost control orientation 
would be associated with superior profit performance, provided 
that the firm was not reactively cutting price. A cost control 
orientation per se would not affect sales performance. 
4.4 INTERPRETING FACTOR 3: “NEW PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT’* 
Factor 3 can be interpreted as: 
“New product development/uniqueness/premium price” 
This would suggest that managers who perceive their SBU’s to be 
stressing new product development, are also aiming for 
uniqueness and the ability to premium price. 
New product development may be undertaken for a variety of 
reasons, including the following: 
l it is a feature of the industry (new product development is 
one of the “rules of the game”: Miller 1988:284) 
l it is to help achieve a superior competitive position in an 
industry that has not, traditionally, competed via product 
innovation 
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* new product development meets management aspirations 
New product development may be a continual priority where the 
industry “rules of the game” dictate this. A failure to innovate 
would lead to competitive disadvantage. Alternatively, where 
product innovation is used aggressively to gain a competitive 
advantage it would be linked to the pursuit of 
superior/unique/distinctive products or services. 
Miller (1986) suggests a subdivision of Porter’s Differentiation 
strategy into innovative differentiation, and marketing 
differentiation. He suggests that this distinction is necessary 
largely due to the different organizational requirements of these 
routes to competitive advantage. Innovative differentiation 
requires the firm to continually develop new products or 
services, whereas in the case of marketing differentiation the 
products or services may remain substantially unaltered, the 
differentiation effort is concentrated in marketing activities 
designed primarily to alter consumers’ perceptions of the 
products. Innovative differentiation would require a flexible, 
decentralised structure, whereas marketing differentiation may 
be sustainable with a much more mechanistic organizational 
form (a machine bureaucracy: Mintzberg 1979). Only the 
marketing activity would require organic, adhocratic forms of 
structure; and in some cases this activity would be sub- 
contracted. 
There are connections, therefore, between these forms of 
differentiation and the five factor solution presented here. 
Factor 3 could be interpreted as Miller’s innovative 
differentiation. New product development, and uniqueness 
leading to premium pricing load on this factor. 
In Miller and Friesen’s study (1986a;1986b) Cluster 7 could be 
interpreted as a New Product Development cluster. These SBUs 
rate significantly above average on price premium, relative 
direct costs, product R&D/Value Added. They are also the only 
cluster to have a positive rating on “percentage of new products”. 
4.5 INTERPRETING FACTOR 5: “SUPERIOR PRODUCTS” 
Miller’s “marketing differentiation” (1986) would correspond to 
Factor 5. Here new product development is not stressed as a 
means towards achieving uniqueness; distinctive products, or 
image conveyed through marketing communications loads 
strongly on to this factor. 
Offering superior products or services to the competition should 
improve market share. Increases in share can lead through to 
improved profit performance if the firm takes advantage of, for 
example scale economies (eg spreading overheads), and/or 
experience curve benefits. Thus Factor 5 should be linked to 
relative sales performance (market share), and it may be linked 
to relative profit performance. 
Miller and Friesen’s (1986a) Cluster 1 and 2 SBUs correspond to 
the “Superior Products” strategy. Here the SBUs do not pursue 
product innovation, but they do emphasize product quality and 
the promotion of perceived product quality (through advertising 
and promotional expenditure). 
5 COMPARING THE FIVE FACTOR SOLUTION WITH DESS 
AND DAVIS (1984) 
Dess and Davis’ (1984) study is directly comparable to the 
approach used here to investigate managerial perceptions of the 
generic strategies, therefore it is useful to compare their 
results with those presented here. Their factor analysis 
produced five factors with eigenvalues > 1. However, they chose 
to eliminate two of the factors, leaving three which they 
interpreted as supporting the generic strategies: a 
differentiation factor (which explained 32% of the variance); a 
“low cost” factor (10.7% of the variance); and a “focus” factor 
(8.6%). “Competitive methods” that loaded on these three factors, 
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that had loadings greater than 0.50 were as follows: 
Factor 1 “Differentiation” 
Brand Identification; Innovation in marketing techniques and 
methods; Control of channels of distribution; Procurement of raw 
materials; Advertising; Forecasting market growth. 
Factor 2 “Low Cost” 
Operating efficiency; Product quality control; 
Experienced/trained personnel; Developing/refining existing 
products; Procurement of raw materials; Reputation within the 
industry; Forecasting market growth. 
Factor 3 “Focus” 
New product development; Capability to manufacture 
speciality products; Products in high price market segments. 
These results could be interpreted as confirming the “five 
factor” solution derived here. Dess and Davis’ Factor 1 is 
equivalent to the “Superior Products” factor; their Factor 2 is 
equivalent to the “Cost control” factor; and their Factor 3 is 
equivalent to the “New Product Development” factor. Moreover, 
one of their “competitive methods” statements refers to 
“Competitive Pricing”. This method does not load on either of the 
three selected factors. We must assume, therefore, that the 
statement loads on one or other of the discarded factors. This, 
then, would corroborate further the similarities between the 
two studies. 
In the second phase of their study, Dess and Davis compare the 
factors derived from the managers’ responses with competitive 
methods identified by “experts” as pertaining to each of the 
generic strategies. The comparisons reveal a marked lack of 
agreement between the “experts” and the managers, although 
Dess and Davis do not interpret the results in this way. Of the 21 
competitive methods used, only four are rated by both groups as 
being important to a differentiation strategy; four are commonly 
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rated as pertaining to “low cost”; and only one method is 
commonly rated as pertaining to “focus”. Important differences 
between the experts and the managers include “competitive 
pricing” (rated by experts only as pertaining to cost leadership); 
and new product development (rated by experts as pertaining to 
differentiation, but not by managers). 
This would support the view that managers’ perceptions of 
competitive strategy are different from those of “academics”, 
and it reinforces the usefulness of the approach adopted in the 
present study. 
6 A MANAGERIAL THEORY OF COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
The challenge presented by these findings is to see if they can be 
interpreted in such a way as to provide a coherent managerial 
perspective of competitive strategy, which avoids the 
ambiguities and inconsistencies of Porter’s approach. 
Two of the factors are clearly associated with gaining 
competitive advantage: one route to advantage is through 
offering superior products or services (F5); the other is through 
competing on price (F4). 
These two competitive thrusts can be represented on the chart in 
Figure 3. The vertical axis represents perceived use value. This 
is the value “in use” perceived by consumers; the tangible and 
intangible benefits perceived to accrue to the consumer through 
purchasing and consuming the products/services; to borrow a 
term from economics, this axis represents the perceived 
“utility” of the products/services on offer. The horizontal axis 
measures price. 
Dickson and Ginter (1987) stress the importance of consumer 
perceptions in establishing their definition of product 
differentiation: 
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“product differentiation is where a product offering is 
perceived by the consumer to differ from its competition on 
any physical or nonphysical product characteristic including 
price” (Dickson and Ginter 1987:4) 
Day and Wensley (1988) take a similar line: 
“...though advantages reside in superior skills and resources, they 
are revealed in competitive product markets. A point of 
advantage can be exploited profitably only when it offers 
significant benefits that are perceived and valued by 
customers.....” (Day and Wensley 1988:16) 
A position in the space defined by the two axes could be viewed 
as representing a particular “value for money” combination of 
perceived use value and price (European Management Journal 
1987:5). 
6.1 REPRESENTING THE CONSUMER ON THE CHART 
In order to represent the consumer in the diagram, in Figure 4 
three “indifference curves” are displayed representing three 
different segments of consumer demand. In order to explain the 
relevance of the curves, we will use the example used by Porter 
(1987) to explore his generic strategy concepts: the “auto 
industry”. 
Segment A are price sensitive consumers, and are only able, or 
are only prepared to pay up to f5,OOO for a new car. Segment B 
are less price sensitive, but their price range has an upper limit 
of flO,OOO. Segment C are prepared to pay up to f25,OOO for a 
car that they perceive to offer high use value. Each indifference 
curve represents a set of combinations of price and perceived 
use-value that consumers view as equivalent: they are 
“indifferent” between these combinations. For each segment, the 
indifference curve represents the “boundary” of acceptable 
price/use value combinations. For example, the Segment A 
consumer cannot afford, or is not prepared, to pay more than 
f 5,000. 
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By plotting these three segments on the same chart we are 
assuming that all three segments value very similar attributes 
of cars, and, as such, the Segment A consumer can appreciate 
that a very expensive car could nevertheless represent “value- 
for-money” even though it is well outside his price range. We are 
assuming therefore, that adding perceived use-value means the 
same thing to all three segments. If this was not the case, then 
it would not be appropriate to draw all three segments on the 
same chart. So, for our example of the auto industry, we could 
assume that all three segments were interested in one class of 
cars, family saloons. 
If a consumer moves along his or her indifference curve they do 
not perceive any change in the “value for money” combination of 
perceived use value and price. However, nested within each of 
the “boundary” indifference curves, are curves that represent 
higher “value for money” combinations. If consumers can move to 
higher indifference curves, they perceive themselves to be 
better off. (See Figure 5) 
6.2 LOCATING FIRMS ON THE CHART 
In the situation depicted in Figure 6 all firms are perceived to be 
offering very similar use values, and they all charge very similar 
prices. This approximates to a commodity industry, where there 
is no product differentiation. In our auto industry example, this 
would represent a situation where consumers were offered a 
standard type of car, for a fixed price. If this was the situation, 
then Segment A consumers would not be in the market at all, as 
the price of these standard cars is too high for them (about 
f10,000). 
6.3 REPRESENTING PORTER’S GENERIC STRATEGIES ON 
THE CHART 
How might Porter’s generic strategy options be represented on 
this chart? As we have argued earlier, Porter’s Cost Leadership 
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strategy, strictly interpreted, would mean that one of the 
cluster of firms has achieved the lowest cost position. As a 
result, that firm will be earning superior profits. But because, by 
definition, the cost leader offers average prices and average 
quality, in the eyes of the consumer the firm is identical to the 
others. In this case it is difficult to argue that the cost 
leadership strategy has enabled the firm to gain a competitive 
advantage over the other firms. This strategy, per se, would not 
affect relative market shares at all. The cost leader does, 
however, have the potential to behave in ways that would be 
perceived to be valuable to the consumer: its low cost position 
could enable it to cut price, or to add more perceived use value 
than the competition. In this sense, then, the cost leader has the 
potential capacity to gain market share through moving west 
(cutting price) or north (adding perceived use value), or doing 
both simultaneously (moving northwest). 
How, then would Porter’s Differentiation strategy be represented 
on the chart? Porter argues that the successful differentiator 
offers superior value, and can, as a result charge premium 
prices. This would move a firm away from the cluster of other 
firms towards the north east part of the chart (higher perceived 
use value, combined with higher prices, depicted in Figure 7). 
Note that this combination would not attract any Segment B 
consumers. The offerings of the differentiator are now outside 
their price range. However, the Segment C consumer would find 
this combination attractive, as it enables him or her to move to 
a higher indifference curve (Figure 7). 
Thus, Porter’s differentiation strategy represents a competitive 
strategy that, for it to be viable, requires the existence of less 
price sensitive segments in the market place. Therefore Porter’s 
differentiation is really to do with identifying and serving 
relatively price insensitive segments. It is, therefore, primarily 
about choosing the ground on which to compete. 
In order to explain the bases of the theory, we have assumed that 
all the firms were initially clustered together. This is clearly 
not the case in the auto industry cited by Porter. Porter suggests 
that, in the auto industry, Mercedes and BMW are successful 
-35- 
PERCEIVED 
USE VALUE co 
HIGH 
LOW HIGH 
PRICE 
FIGURE 7 PORTER’S DIFFERENTIATION STRATEGY 
-36- 
differentiators. These firms offer products targeted at the 
relatively price insensitive consumer (our Segmeni C 
consumers). 
If a firm serving Segment B decided to become a “differentiator”, 
it would, presumably increase the perceived use value it offered 
and increase the price of its cars. Would this firm gain 
competitive advantage? This begs the question: over whom would 
this firm be looking to gain competitive advantage? From our 
chart (Figure 7) the Segment B consumer would only tolerate a 
very marginal price increase (maybe 5% ?), even if the perceived 
use value associated with it were high. If the differentiator 
were looking to premium price above this level he would be 
moving away from one group of competitors, those who are 
staying to serve Segment B. 
If the differentiator is moving to serve a different segment, then 
the relevant question is whether the firm has gained advantage 
over the existing servers of this different segment (those 
currently serving Segment C), rather than those left serving 
Segment B. Simply trying to move from Segment B to serving 
Segment C does not confer any competitive advantage. In the auto 
industry example, this would be a firm like Nissan (serving 
Segment B), moving up to compete with Mercedes and BMW (who 
are the incumbents serving Segment C). We could only judge 
whether Nissan had gained competitive advantage by comparing 
them to Mercedes and BMW, not Ford or Fiat. 
To conclude, plotting the generic strategies on this chart 
highlights that: 
l cost leadership, per se, does not confer competitive 
advantage 
+ differentiation is essentially to do with choosing the 
ground on which to compete, it is not about gaining competitive 
advantage 
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6.4 REPRESENTING THE MANAGERIAL STRATEGIC 
THRUSTS ON THE CHART 
To recap, the factor analysis revealed four strategic thrusts: 
Fl Cost control 
F3 New product development 
F4 Compete on price 
F5 Superior product 
F4 Compete on Price 
We will examine, first, the F4 thrust which is about competing 
on price. 
The F4 thrust moves the firm to the west on the chart (Figure 8): 
here the firm is offering the same perceived use value as the 
competition, but is charging lower prices. Note that this 
assumes that the consumers do not use price as an indicator of 
perceived use value. If some of them do, then the move west 
becomes a shift southwest: in the consumers eyes the firm is not 
offering equivalent use value to the competition. 
If all the competitors remained where they were, this price cut 
would lead to a dramatic increase in market share, as the 
Segment B consumers could all now access a higher indifference 
curve by moving to the price cutter’s products. Because of this it 
is inevitable that the other firms will be forced to cut prices to, 
at least, match those of the first mover. The net result would be 
a new, lower, average price ruling in the industry, and with 
shares probably remaining unchanged. The likelihood, therefore, 
that firms will imitate this competitive strategy is high, in the 
short term. 
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There may be, however, frictions that may make it difficult or 
costly for consumers to immediately switch to the lower priced 
offering (tangible switching costs), or the product may be an 
infrequent .purchase. These factors may reduce the need of the 
higher priced firms to immediately cut prices to match the first 
mover. 
In order to sustain competitive advantage from this thrust the 
firm would have to continually drive down prices. This could only 
be possible if the firm had lower costs than the competition (it 
might uitimately have to be the lowest cost producer), or if it 
were funded by other, profitable, parts of its parent corporation. 
The risks associated with this strategy are high: unless a firm 
can be confident that it can ultimateley benefit from price 
cutting, the probability is that this manouevre merely reduces 
industry profitability. However, if a firm can achieve low prices 
and lowest costs (by, for instance, translating market share 
gains into experience, and scale, cost advantages) it may be able 
to drive out higher cost competitors. Having achieved this, and 
having set up some additional entry barriers in the process, the 
firm may then begin to raise prices. 
In order to sustain this route to competitive advantage, 
therefore, the firm must be able to sustain lower prices for 
longer than the competition. This would suggest a need to be the 
lowest cost producer in the industry. Therefore, despite the 
reservations expressed about the interpretation of Statement 19 
(“We aim to be the lowest cost producer in the industry”), its 
loading on Factor 4 (compete on price) may in fact reflect both 
interpretations: the firm needs to be lowest price, AND lowest 
cost if it is to successfully pursue this option 
F5 Superior Products 
The F5 thrust moves the firm North, away from the other 
competitors, by offering higher perceived value for the same 
price. The new offering combines higher perceived use value with 
the same prices as the competition, a combination that places 
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consumers on a higher indifference curve (see Figure 9). In order 
to achieve this the firm must know what it is that customers 
value, and communicate to consumers that they can deliver this. 
It should be noted that a firm’s efforts to add value may not be 
appreciated by customers (for example, the case of P&G “potato 
chips” cited by Aaker (1989:99)). In other words, the management 
may perceive that they have shifted their SBU north, but, in the 
eyes of consumers the firm may still be seen to be offering 
equivalent products/services to the competition. 
Moving north by adding perceived use value may offer more 
opportunities to achieve sustainable advantages than the price 
cutting strategy (F4), particularly if the firm can add many 
dimensions of perceived use value. In addition, the source of 
higher perceived use value may be difficult for other firms to 
imitate: brand identity, physical location, proprietary expertise, 
patents. 
Both of these thrusts, F4 and F5, will lead to competitive 
advantage: the firm will increase its market share by either of 
these moves, and will sustain this advantage as long as no other 
firms follow suit and imitate the move; or until consumers 
change their preferences. The moves west (cutting price) would 
not appear to offer the same opportunities to achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage as moves north. Price cuts 
can be quickly matched (indeed competitors may have no option 
but to follow the price cutter downwards). 
F3 New Product Development 
F3 (New Product Development) is linked with the pursuit of 
uniqueness and premium pricing (Statement 9). Firms pursuing 
this thrust would be moving northeast in Figure IO. This move 
could still be regarded as a competitive strategy as long as the 
price premium was not so great as to move the firm away from 
its existing segment. If the price premium is large enough to 
move the firm away from its existing customer base, then the 
chart should be redrawn. Now the firm should be positioned along 
with other firms who are perceived by this less price sensitive 
-41- 
PERCEIVED 
USE 
FIRMS CLUSTERED HERE 
HWi 
PRICE 
FIGURE 9 SEGMENT B: OFFERING HIGHER PERCEIVED 
USE VALUE 
-42- 
PERCEIVED 
USE VALUE 
HIGH 
LOW 
LOW HIGH 
PRICE 
FIGURE 10 OFFERING HIGHER PERCEIVED VALUE THROUGH 
PRODUCT INNOVATION 
-43- 
segment as offering competing products. 
Movements on the diagonal (Northeast, or Southwest) should 
properly be regarded, then, as movements to different segments 
of demand. For example, if a firm moved northeast it would 
clearly be offering higher perceived value, and charging higher 
prices. To return to Porter’s example of the “auto” industry, this 
would be moving “up market”. The middle ground (serving 
Segment B) would be occupied by Ford, Nissan and Fiat, the North 
East segment (Segment C) would be addressed by Mercedes and 
BMW. The appropriate analysis of Mercedes position would be to 
compare it to those firms whom their potential customers 
perceive as viable alternative suppliers of their needs. 
Similarly, a move “down market” from serving Segment B, would 
pitch the firm alongside Hyundai, Lada, Proton, and Skoda. Again, 
the chart should be redrawn. 
Thus for each segment of demand the consumers will perceive a 
set of possible suppliers of their needs. In addressing issues of 
competitive advantage, it is a firm’s positioning relative to the 
consumers’ perceptions of alternative suppliers that is 
important. Within each segment firms have to gain competitive 
advantage through either offering the same perceived use value 
at lower prices (the F4 thrust), or by offering higher perceived 
use value for the same (or only slightly higher) prices. 
6.5 COMPETITIVE STRATEGY AND PROFITABILITY: Fl 
“Cost Control” 
On their own, neither the move north (achieved through adding 
perceived use value), nor the move west (by offering equivalent 
use value at a lower price) will improve firm profitability. 
Delivering higher perceived value may increase costs (added 
features, more brand advertising); and price cutting may merely 
lead to eroded margins. For either thrust to lead through to 
improved profitability the firm must control costs. Without 
close cost control margins will be eroded (by price cuts in the 
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case of F4; or by cost increases in the case of F5). Hence, in 
order to translate the higher market shares potentially available 
through competitive strategies F4 and F5 into superior profits, 
the firm must address cost control (the Fl thrust). 
Clearly, efficient control of costs is essential for the F4 
(compete on price) thrust. It has been argued above that, for this 
strategy to succeed the firm may well need to be the lowest cost 
producer in the industry, to enable it to sustain lower prices 
longer than the competition. However, cost control is 
nevertheless important to the firm pursuing the F5 thrust 
(adding higher perceived use value). Without vigorous control of 
costs the firm may be unable to convert market share gains into 
profits. 
We have argued that the F5 (superior products) thrust does not 
involve premium pricing. We have also pointed out that examples 
Porter uses of successful differentiators are really examples of 
firms competing for particular, less price sensitive consumers. 
So a firm has to decide, firstly, what ground it wishes to 
compete on: ie. what is the target segment (Aaker 1989:91)? 
Having determined this, the firm then needs to decide how to 
compete in serving this segment: to compete on price, or through 
adding higher perceived use value. Either of these strategic 
thrusts will lead to increased share of this segment’s 
consumers. The increased shares could be translated (indeed, 
should be translated) into lower costs than the other firms 
serving this segment. Thus it is quite conceivable that firms 
pursuing the F5 (superior products) thrust could also be the 
lowest cost producer of the firms serving this segment (Hill 
1988). (Share gains should be translatable into scale and 
experience-based cost advantages). The connection between 
higher perceived use value and lower cost positions is supported 
by empirical research (Phillips, Chang and Buzzell 1983; Fine 
1983; Buzzell and Gale 1987). 
The combination of higher perceived use value and low costs 
would place the firm in a powerful competitive position, for, if 
the other firms were able to imitate their added perceived use 
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value offerings, the first mover would be in a position to add yet 
more perceived use values, or, indeed, to cut prices. Either way, 
the competition would be placed at a competitive disadvantage. 
In order to achieve sustainable competitive advantage through 
the F5 (superior products) thrust the firm must maintain a 
positive gap between itself and its competitors (as perceived by 
the consumer). Moves north that can be readily imitated confer 
only temporary competitive advantages. Indeed, if competitors 
are able to imitate at lower cost than the innovator, the 
innovator may end up with a relatively lower profitability. Once 
?he move north has been copied, it becomes the new “norm”, or 
average perceived use-value, in the industry; the improvement in 
service or quality ceases to confer competitive advantage: 
“A skili that all competitors have will not be the basis for a 
sustainable competitive advantage.” (Aaker 1989:98) 
To sustain the gap between its position and the positions of 
competitors, the firm must either delivered sources of 
perceived use value that are very difficult or costly to imitate 
(thus preserving a “static” gap), or the firm must continually add 
perceived use value to keep one jump ahead of the competition 
(preserving a “dynamic” gap). The pace and frequency of 
innovation will vary between industries (Miller 1988:284) But, 
clearly, if two or more firms are aggressively pursuing the F5 
strategy, then there is likely to be a continual “ratcheting” 
upwards of the average acceptable perceived use value in the 
industry, as each firm attempts to leap-frog its rivals. 
Fl (Cost Control) by itself would not lead to any perceived shift 
(from the consumers’ perspective) in the firm’s position in 
Figure 6. Firms in this position may achieve good profit 
performance so long as other firms locate around the same space 
(ie offer similar perceived use value, and charge similar prices). 
Firms pursuing cost control alone are vulnerable to competitors 
moving west (through price cuts), or north (through 
improvements in perceived use value). The cost control 
orientated firm may be better able to respond to price cuts than 
to value improvements. This could result from an excessively 
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internally focussed management team, and through rigidities in 
the organization that have resulted from the development of a 
cost efficient structure (de-skilling, automation, 
proceduralisation, centralisation of decision making, elaborate 
hierarchies). 
Hence, it may well be the case that the pursuit of cost control to 
excess may detract from the firm’s ability to add perceived use 
value. Thus, when a competitor moves north the cost control 
orientated firm may be unable to respond. As other competitors 
move north to match the superior perceived use value offerings 
of the innovator, the cost control firm is left behind. It is now 
offering lower perceived use value at the same prices as the 
competition. This is not a sustainable market position. If moves 
north are too difficult, the firm may find itself cutting price 
just to stay in the market. This reactive price cutting strategy 
may be viable (if their is a segment, as yet unserved, that values 
this combination of lower than average value combined with 
lower prices). But the dangers are that this move merely 
temporarily postpones the decline of the firm (Miller and Friesen 
1986b). 
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APPENDIX 
THE “PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC PRIORITIES” 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
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PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGY 
Company: 
Division/Business Unit: 
(if appropriate) 
Name: 
Function/Department. 
Position in Organisation: 
Indicate your position in 
relaticn t3 the Managing 
Director of firm - e.g. 
Managing Director 
I 
I 
J 
Marketing 
Director 
I I 
Sales Manager 
(Me) 
i- . . . 
9 : 3 
n t -49- 
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGY 
INTRODL’CTION 
This brief questionnaire is designed to help discover your perceptions of your firm’s strategy. In 
answering the questionnaire assume each statement applies to the most logical ‘unit’ in the firm 
For example, in a diversified organisation. these statements would apply IO a single business unit or 
division. If the statement does not apply at all to your firm/division/unit then circle (I). If the 
statement accurately describes the situation in the firm. circle (5). The numbers (2) to (4) ennble 
you to indicate intermediate positions in between these two extremes. 
Please note that we are interested in your firm’s CURRENT STRATEGY; the statements refer to 
what your firm is doing NOW, not what you think it might be doing some time in the future. 
Thank you for your help. 
Cliff Boc man 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
IO. 
I I. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
We place considerable emphasis 
on the control of operating 
costs 
The strategic direction we are now 
pursuing represents a significant 
change from that pursued in the past 
This statement 
does not apply 
to our firm 
1 2 3 
I 2 3 
We emphasise our distinctive 
products or image in our marketing 
communications 
1 
Our organisation, and the way things I 
get done within it, have changed 
little in recent times 
There is constant pressure here 
to cut overhead costs 
We make extensive efforts to secure 
the lowest cost sources of supply 
We regularly develop new products/ 
services, or significantly change the 
line of products/services we offer 
We try hard to maintain the maximum I 
feasible utilisation of our capacity/ 
resources 
We try to offer unique products/ 
services enabling us to charge 
premium prices 
I 
We give new product/service 
development top priority 
I 
We emphasise competitive prices in 
our marketing communications 
I 
Our line of products/services seldom 
change in a substantive manner 
I 
We carefully monitor operations to 
help us keep costs under control 
1 
Currently, we are trying to operate I 
this business in significantly different 
ways to those we have in the past 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
This statement 
accurately 
describes the 
situation in 
our firm 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
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This statement 
does not apply 
to our firm 
15. As our customers are very price I 
sensitive, we devote considerable 
time and effort into improving 
efficiency 
16. The organisational structure and/or I 
processes we are now using represent 
a noticeable change from our recent past 
17. Informa:ion about sales performance 1 
is considered to be more important 
than cost control information 
18. We aim to offer superior products/ I 
services to tirose of our competitors 
19. We aim to be the lowest cost I 
producer in our industry 
20. We try to operate this business in I 
much the same way today as we have 
in the past 
21. Because we offer very similar products/ I 
services to the competition, we try to 
maintain competitive prices 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
This statement 
accurately 
describes the 
situation in 
our firm 
5 
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